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Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-
Mindedness, and Modern Economic 
Formalism in Contract Law 
Shawn J. Bayern† 
Rational ignorance is the familiar notion that it would be foolish for an 
individual to gather and process all possible information. Some information just 
isn’t worth having. Speaking more strictly, some information isn’t worth 
pursuing or processing, because the expected cost of acquiring and assimilating 
it exceeds its expected value. So as good rational actors, we are better off not 
knowing some things.1 
Despite a name that may seem counterintuitive to nonspecialists, the 
notion of rational ignorance is mostly unremarkable.2 Even those of us whose 
 
  Copyright © 2009 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of 
their publications. 
 † Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law; Visiting Assistant 
Professor of Law, Duke Law School; B.S., Yale University; J.D., University of California, 
Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall). This article has benefited from discussions with Kate 
Bartlett, Stuart Benjamin, Curtis Bridgeman, Jamie Boyle, Vladimir Cole, Mel Eisenberg, 
Anthony Di Franco, Paul Haagen, Harris Hartz, Don Horowitz, Roman Hoyos, John Golden, Mitu 
Gulati, Barak Richman, David Russcol, Larry Sager, Chris Schroeder, Mark Seidenfeld, Ken 
Stern, Zephyr Teachout, and Noah Weisbord. All errors are the product of rational tradeoffs. 
1. The phrase “rational ignorance” arises chiefly in discussions related to political 
economics and public-choice theory, although I use the term more broadly in this Essay. See, e.g., 
Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 Cornell L. 
Rev. 280, 306 (2002) (“[R]ational ignorance and other collective action problems make it difficult 
for even well-educated citizens to effectively monitor the performance of government.”); John O. 
McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social 
Discovery, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 485, 503 n.81 (2002) (“‘Rational ignorance’ describes the 
systematic tendency of diffuse citizens to pay little attention to political information.”). Modern 
discussion of the idea in this context seems to originate with the political economist Anthony 
Downs. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957); see also George 
J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961). For applications of the 
same concept in law, see, for example, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211 (1995). 
2. Many economists tend to classify and promote things they can present as 
counterintuitive. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Commentary, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 Minn. L. 
Rev. 917, 917 (1986) (arguing against “novelty, surprise, and unconventionality” in economics 
and law). That is, “ignorance” is ordinarily considered a bad thing, yet some of it is rational. Just 
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careers center on information and ideas don’t want to spend all our time and 
resources reading law-review articles and treatises, or even newspapers and 
Wikipedia; there are, occasionally, other things to do. Moreover, the costs of 
acquiring information are not just financial; we are expected, as sensitive 
human beings, to honor other people’s privacy and perhaps to avoid fascination 
with certain kinds of information, as the phrase “morbid curiosity” suggests. 
Sometimes, too, acquiring excessive information leads us to make worse 
decisions, given other limits on our rationality and the rationality of others. For 
example, full-body tomographic scans might not be a good idea for young, 
healthy people, even if they were costless and didn’t expose patients to 
potentially dangerous radiation: discovering harmless anomalies might lead to 
unwarranted concern or, worse, unnecessary medical procedures.3 
Although rational ignorance is often framed in terms of information, it is 
equally applicable to cognitive processing. For instance, it may well be both 
rational and appropriate for individuals to assume that certain arguments or 
ideas are incorrect or unhelpful before even hearing them.4 I call this 
preemptive intolerance for new arguments “rational closed-mindedness.” For 
example, it is probably unnecessary to evaluate each new astounding marketing 
claim we receive in spam e-mails; summarily deleting these e-mails is likely 
more reasonable than a thoughtful inquiry into precisely how we might 
costlessly get out of debt or order name-brand drugs from abroad. For many 
people, the same is generally true for new claims by “alternative medicine” 
 
as some economists seem to delight in observing that there should be nonzero levels of contract 
breaches, accidents, and crime, there are also optimal nonzero levels of ignorance. See Robert 
Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 491 (5th ed. 2007) (crime); Richard A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law 119–20 (7th ed. 2007) (contract breaches); W. Kip Viscusi, 
Punitive Damages: The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental 
and Safety Torts, 87 Geo. L.J. 285, 329–30 (1998) (accidents); see also W. Kip Viscusi & Richard 
J. Zeckhauser, Recollection Bias and the Combat of Terrorism, 34 J. Legal Stud. 27, 33 (2005) 
(terrorism). 
Although the phenomenon of “rational ignorance” demonstrates that it is rational to ignore 
some facts, it would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that we want more ignorance than we 
have now. Ordinarily, when we say that someone is “ignorant” or that a road is “unsafe,” we 
already mean “irrationally ignorant” or “unreasonably unsafe.” That the optimal level of a bad 
thing is nonzero says very little about the validity of intuitions that levels of the bad thing are 
already too high. 
3. See Comm. on Med. Aspects of Radiation in the Env’t, Twelfth Report 17 
(2007), available at http://www.comare.org.uk/documents/COMARE12thReport.pdf (“[A] 
number of CT examinations will result in the detection of lesions that may be clinically 
unimportant or non-life-threatening. These findings may result in further investigations, which 
may themselves carry additional risks to the individual.”). Of course, doctors might adjust their 
procedures for diagnosis and treatment (and patients might rationally adjust their tendency toward 
fear or anxiety) to accommodate the results that cheap and frequent full-body CT scans would 
tend to produce. The problem is that, given other limits on the rationality of individuals and 
groups, we might not expect them to do so perfectly—at least, not right away. 
4. I take this sort of rationality to lie behind a letter I once received from a publication, 
explaining that it could not publish my manuscript even though it “looks very interesting” (private 
correspondence on file with author) (emphasis added). 
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healers; we can rely on our prior evaluation of the whole discipline’s failures 
rather than evaluate each new argument thoroughly. Detailed characterizations 
of this phenomenon are not prominent in academic literature5 (perhaps because 
closed-mindedness sounds like it’s a bad thing to optimize), but its contours are 
similar to those of rational ignorance. 
What applies to individuals, however, does not necessarily apply to 
courts. My aim in this Essay is to demonstrate that modern economic 
formalism in contract law is little more than an erroneous argument that courts 
ought to be (rationally) ignorant and (rationally) closed-minded in particular 
ways. Specifically, economic formalism posits that the law will function better, 
in view of the costs of adjudication, if courts narrowly limit the field of 
information or arguments that they permit themselves to consider when hearing 
cases. Distinct from other brands of textual formalism that suggest that a strict 
reliance on the text of contracts promotes certainty in adjudication, reduces 
judicial discretion, or achieves other goals, economic formalism in contract law 
rests on the same idea as rational ignorance and rational closed-mindedness—
namely, that a more thorough consideration of information and arguments is 
simply not worthwhile, in view of its costs.6 
This Essay proceeds in two stages. First, I describe rational ignorance and 
rational closed-mindedness in order to frame the discussion. My goal in this 
stage is to demonstrate that in contract-interpretation litigation, the justification 
for rational ignorance and closed-mindedness in individuals fails to generalize 
to courts. To be fair, formalists do not precisely argue that it does, so it may at 
 
5. There is some discussion of rational closed-mindedness in the limited context of 
forecasts by stock analysts, who are said to be “rationally stubborn” because “abler advisers make 
smaller revisions in their forecasts,” and analysts may accordingly stick with what they’ve said in 
order to “look good,” like those supposedly abler analysts. Tilman Ehrbeck & Robert Waldmann, 
Why Are Professional Forecasters Biased? Agency Versus Behavioral Explanations, 111 Q.J. 
Econ. 21, 22 (1996). In other words, in some industries or professions, having a reputation for 
open-mindedness might be a bad thing, and thus people may tend to be more closed-minded than 
they would otherwise be. This sort of reputational signaling is a much more limited phenomenon 
than the one I describe in the text. 
There are sadly other professions, too, where open-mindedness is considered a problem. 
Several high-level politicians have been criticized as being the “victim[s] of [their] last 
conversation[s].” Melinda Henneberger, A Gore Daughter Emerges as a Leading Adviser, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 20, 1999, at A1 (Al Gore); see also Maureen Dowd, Making and Remaking a 
Political Identity: George Herbert Walker Bush, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1992, at A1 (George H.W. 
Bush); Maureen Dowd, The Education of Dan Quayle, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1989, at A1 (Dan 
Quayle). While great indecision in a leader may be undesirable, I think I would prefer a decision 
maker who is the victim of his last conversation over one who is the victim of his first. 
6. In contract law, economic arguments are currently the most prominent defenses of 
formalism. Cf. Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: 
Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1443, 1446 (2008) (“Aside from a notable push from some law-and-economics scholars, no one 
has developed a sustained argument for a return to formalism in contract law . . . .”) (footnote 
omitted). Bridgeman’s article, by contrast, is a defense of formalism in terms of its ability to 
“guide conduct.” Id. at 1467. 
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first appear that I am knocking down straw men. The purpose of the discussion, 
however, is merely to suggest skepticism of the notion that courts should 
categorically ignore information when it is agreed, by hypothesis, that the 
information will lead to better results. 
Second, I respond to the most influential argument for economic 
formalism in contract law by demonstrating particular weaknesses from which 
the argument suffers. The argument comes from Alan Schwartz and Robert 
Scott, two leading theorists of contract law.7 Schwartz and Scott’s argument is 
specifically that rational, risk-neutral contracting parties prefer formalist 
interpretive methodologies that depend mostly on the text of written contracts 
to broader methodologies that consider more sources of information and are 
more likely to discover the parties’ actual agreement. Schwartz and Scott argue 
that formalist methodologies are preferable because they are less expensive and 
do not affect the “average” (or expected) result; instead, they affect only the 
range (or variance) of possible results, and risk-neutral parties don’t care about 
the range. As I will show, this argument—despite its cleverness and initial 
appeal—seriously misstates the costs and benefits of formalism for several 
reasons. 
First, and most fundamentally, it confuses probability with uncertainty. 
That is, it assumes that probability distributions of events like litigation results 
are known specifically, and that parties can make decisions with them in mind, 
rather than acknowledging that such distributions are unknown and often 
unknowable. Second, it draws distinctions between “gaps” in contracts and 
questions of interpretation, but these distinctions are both untenable and 
impossible to determine by the time litigation occurs. Finally, in dealing with 
only those cases that reach a particular stage in litigation, it ignores the impact 
of some prominent features of litigation, such as the possibility of settlement. 
 
7. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
Yale L.J. 541 (2003). Schwartz and Scott’s argument has, for good reason, received substantial 
attention and interest; it has also received some insightful criticism. For instance, commentators 
have discussed other problems with Schwartz and Scott’s analysis, such as its questionable 
assumptions about human language, Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Bewitchment of Intelligence: 
Language and Ex Post Illusions of Intention, 78 Temp. L. Rev. 99 (2005), and its propensity to 
promote bad faith during performance, Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad 
Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 
96 Ky. L.J. 43 (2007); James W. Bowers, Murphy’s Law and the Elementary Theory of Contract 
Interpretation: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 587, 601 (2005) (“Wide 
margins of error have potential incentive effects. Once contracts are formed, both parties have an 
incentive to chisel—to maneuver to divert as much of the contractual revenues to themselves and 
to transfer as much of the costs as feasible to the other party. If a party thinks there is a good 
chance that its chiseling behavior will be protected by an erroneous contract interpretation, the 
more chiseling will tend to occur.”). 
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I 
RATIONAL CLOSED-MINDEDNESS IN INDIVIDUALS 
The rational ignorance of individuals is well documented.8 For instance, in 
searching for a product or a job, individuals rarely consider every possibility.9 
It is worth understanding the ways in which rational ignorance may 
appropriately characterize individual behavior, because some of these ways 
may be more relevant to analyses of contract interpretation than others. 
To begin with, it is worth recognizing that rational ignorance and closed-
mindedness need not be absolute, even where they apply to particular 
information and arguments. When faced with a new fact or argument, we have 
more choices than simply considering it or not considering it. We might ignore 
it completely, consider it quickly without trying to understand its significance, 
study it carefully, and so on. Ignorance and closed-mindedness simply reflect 
decisions not to consider (or habits of not considering) the significance of a 
new fact or argument. 
Broadly speaking, rational ignorance and closed-mindedness address two 
distinct problems: diminishing returns and bias. The problem of diminishing 
returns arises when we think that the new information or point of view will help 
us overall (that is, it has a positive expected value), but we might also think that 
the costs of finding or processing it are too high. Commentators typically 
describe rational ignorance in this context.10 For example, in searching for a job 
or a needed product, the search itself (and the processing of information) has 
costs, and we expect individuals at least loosely to weigh those costs against the 
expected benefits of further information. Individuals don’t necessarily decide 
how long to search for jobs or products by performing explicit rational 
calculations, but it is not unreasonable to imagine that they try to avoid some of 
the costs—even just the tediousness or unpleasantness—of searching for 
something long past the point of diminishing returns. 
A second problem, which is less recognized in discussions of rational 
ignorance and closed-mindedness, is the concern that the information we’re 
considering acquiring could bias us in a particular direction, in ways for which 
we can’t always easily correct. This might occur in cases of full-body CT 
scans, as I mentioned before. It is probably irrational for most people to acquire 
detailed information about every physical abnormality in their bodies, given 
that they are not trained to understand, among other things, that most of these 
abnormalities are medically irrelevant.11 As another example, if a voter around 
election time expects that a cable news channel offers information that is biased 
 
 8. See supra note 1. 
 9. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of 
Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 1044–45 
& n.149 (2005). 
10. See, e.g., id.; see also supra note 1. 
11. See supra note 3. 
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toward a particular viewpoint, she might rationally avoid watching that 
channel. The alternative—watching it and being swayed by the biased 
information the channel presents—might be worse than remaining less 
informed but unbiased. 
In general, for an individual to be rational in ignoring information and 
arguments even though they are free or extremely inexpensive to process, the 
individual must expect that his or her own processing is potentially skewed in 
ways for which it is difficult to correct. Bias in the source of information is not, 
strictly speaking, enough. For example, in the case of a newscast that we expect 
to be biased, there is little danger if the bias is known and if we trust our ability 
to account for it. We can simply factor the information appropriately into our 
broader understanding, realizing that it’s of little worth if it’s in fact of little 
worth. Avoidance becomes increasingly rational as we become more afraid that 
new information or arguments may bias us in ways that we cannot easily 
predict or account for. 
An expectation that one has imperfect cognition is not relevant only when 
processing biased information; it may well apply when processing entirely 
accurate information. A towering body of psychological research highlights the 
many cognitive biases that humans experience—everything from loss 
aversion12 and confirmation biases13 to implicit racial prejudices.14 One way to 
respond to cognitive biases is to educate oneself about them in an attempt to 
learn to avoid their effects; reading psychological studies can sometimes (but 
not always) work as a kind of inoculation against various kinds of 
systematically-biased cognition that people display in experimental tests. But 
another way to respond to a known cognitive bias is to realize that one is 
cognitively limited and to counteract it at a grosser level by making 
presumptions in favor of choices against which one is knowingly biased, or by 
shielding oneself from information that may trigger a bias. So, for example, 
someone who recognizes a personal bias against hiring people older than forty 
might explicitly instruct applicants not to list their ages. Alternatively, one 
might put a thumb on the scale in favor of certain information or arguments, in 
order to counteract known biases. For example, Bill Gates once wrote: “I make 
it a point to read at least one newsweekly from cover to cover because it 
broadens my interests. If I read only what intrigues me, such as the science 
section and a subset of the business section, then I finish the magazine the same 
person I was before I started. So I read it all.”15 
 
12. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979). 
13. See P.C. Wason, On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J. 
Experimental Psychol. 129 (1960). 
14. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 
969 (2006). 
15. Bill Gates, Reading Difficulties: The Bill Gates Column, The Guardian (London), 
Feb. 16, 1995, at 6. This is essentially the sort of “thumb on the scale” I have in mind in the text: 
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Given that rational ignorance and closed-mindedness help individuals to 
cope with the problems of diminishing returns and bias, it may seem justifiable 
for courts to ignore broad classes of information. And this notion is at least 
worth considering. But as I argue in Part II, it would be a mistake to generalize 
too far from individuals to courts, and no such generalization supports textual 
formalism in contract interpretation. 
II 
MODERN ECONOMIC FORMALISM AS PURPORTEDLY RATIONAL IGNORANCE 
AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS IN COURTS 
In law, the term formalism has many meanings.16 In the context of 
interpreting legal documents, it often refers to a position known alternatively as 
textualism. The central tenet of this kind of formalism is that legal documents 
should be interpreted without (much) regard for information beyond their text. 
As I noted earlier, there are several possible justifications for textual formalism, 
but they all urge a fairly narrow restriction of information and arguments in 
interpreting contracts,17 statutes,18 and even cases.19 For example, two 
mainstays of modern formalist argument are that it is ordinarily advantageous 
for courts to ignore legislative history in statutory cases20 and evidence of oral 
agreements in many contracts cases.21 
When put in this way, of course, the connection between rational 
ignorance, rational closed-mindedness, and formalism becomes clear: 
 
if you know your interests are limited, you might intentionally ignore those interests in choosing 
what to read. 
16. One significant version of formalism is also called conceptualism: the view of law as a 
closed system, operating by its own rules and with relatively fixed categories, heedless of its 
effects on the world. Under this view, law is its own goal instead of a way to achieve the social 
purposes people may want to set for it (whatever those purposes may be). Conceptualism was the 
dominant approach to law at the time law schools arose in America, and it appears to be gaining 
adherents once again. See, e.g., Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms and Judicial Rulemaking: 
Commitment to Political Process and the Basis of Tort Law, 49 Kan. L. Rev. 65, 72 (2000) (“In 
fact, much of the significant tort scholarship of the past few decades can be described as ‘neo-
conceptualist,’ i.e., scholarship that seeks to identify some single value or set of values that 
underlie, and thus provide, some universally accepted basis (not to mention cohesiveness) for 
modern tort doctrine.”). 
The chief characteristic of conceptualism is that it insulates itself from (some) social facts, 
arguments about the law’s functions, and instrumental or moral purposes. This sort of 
conceptualism deserves greater treatment but it is not my focus here, although its willingness to 
restrict drastically the field of information and arguments that are considered “legal” is 
representative of formalism in general. 
17. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7. 
18. See generally, Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role 
of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of 
Interpretation: Federal Courts and The Law 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
19. See Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009). 
20. See Scalia, supra note 18, at 29–37. 
21. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 576–77. 
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formalism is, at heart, an argument for ignorance or closed-mindedness. 
Correspondingly, economic defenses of formalism are arguments for 
purportedly rational ignorance or closed-mindedness. 
Because it is often rational for individuals to close themselves off from 
facts and arguments, it might seem only natural to assume courts should do so 
too. And indeed, there are clear cases in which courts should ignore 
information and arguments. As an important but obvious example, it would be 
unjust to consider the race, gender, age, or sexual orientation of parties in cases 
where these features did not matter, and the common law is similarly hesitant to 
consider parties’ wealth.22 This familiar refusal to consider some facts may 
represent an attempt to avoid bias, as I described in Part I.23 In some sense, it 
may even be fair to call this refusal “formalist” and to acknowledge at least a 
limited role for “ignorance” in the law, captured roughly by the familiar saying 
that “justice is blind.” 
But beyond familiar cases in which courts exclude evidence of a kind that 
we have collectively decided simply shouldn’t be relevant in deciding cases, it 
is a mistake to generalize too far from the rational ignorance of individuals to 
the rational ignorance of courts. The reasons to reject this generalization largely 
track my discussion in Part I about rational ignorance and closed-mindedness in 
individuals. Recall the following observations regarding individuals: (1) 
ignorance and closed-mindedness need not be absolute, but instead can 
manifest themselves as investing marginally less effort in or paying less 
attention to new information or arguments; and (2) rational ignorance and 
closed-mindedness address two distinct problems—the costs of acquiring and 
processing new information, and expected bias. These observations suggest 
ways in which formalism (as rational ignorance and obstinacy) fails to apply 
appropriately to courts, at least in the way formalists think it should. 
To begin with, consider that rational ignorance in individuals is not 
usually absolute. Bright-line rules requiring courts to ignore certain kinds of 
information wholesale are a formalist staple.24 But an absolute bar to 
information goes beyond the kind of rational ignorance individuals ordinarily 
adopt: individuals are usually willing at least to glance at information they plan 
to ignore, and they certainly are not ordinarily governed by procedures that 
prevent them from doing so. 
 
22. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice of 
Efficient Civil Liability Rules, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 247 (1988) (“[A] given loss reduces the 
utility of a rich person less than a poor person . . . [but this is a consideration] that by long 
historical tradition in common law civil disputes the courts are supposed sedulously to eschew. If 
they were now to become influential in determinations of liability, they would cast courts in a 
radically new role.”). 
23. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”). 
24. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 576–77. I respond in detail to such 
arguments in Part III, infra. 
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As for informational costs, courts themselves usually face relatively low 
costs in acquiring information and arguments because the litigants themselves 
ordinarily supply them. Of course, systemically, the costs of acquiring 
information and making arguments may be much larger; this is a point I 
address in more detail in Part III. My observation for now is only that courts, 
looking out for their own interests, have little reason to refuse to hear certain 
kinds of facts or arguments wholesale merely on the ground that it is too 
expensive for them to do so. Actually processing—that is, fully considering—
the information may well be expensive for courts, but there is no reason to 
think the kinds of information that the formalists wish to exclude (such as 
precontractual memos or legislative history) is systematically any more 
expensive than the fairly intensive cognitive processing that represents courts’ 
ordinary function. In other words, if we’re concerned that courts have too much 
information to process in general, limiting arguments that textualists want to 
limit would be an arbitrary and odd way to help them; the cure would not fit the 
ailment. 
Finally, even though judges and others who work in courts are human 
beings who likely suffer from individual cognitive biases, institutional 
considerations make it systematically less likely that courts will suffer from the 
sort of cognitive biases that make rational ignorance and rational closed-
mindedness appealing for individuals. The primary reason for this is that 
common-law courts hear arguments from adverse parties, who can correct one 
another’s information and arguments and otherwise draw attention to the kinds 
of skewed processing from which individuals may suffer. It is likely that if a 
court hears the equivalent of a biased news broadcast, it will also hear an 
opposing party correct it.25 
Even if one of the parties fails in its argumentative role, appellate courts in 
America ordinarily are comprised of multiple judges, who at least theoretically 
can check one another’s biases. For instance, Justice Scalia has famously 
quoted Judge Leventhal in describing legislative history “as the equivalent of 
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for 
one’s friends.”26 After doing this, he (less famously) proceeded to describe 
precisely how he believed the majority’s use of legislative history was 
misleading.27 That analyzing legislative history can lead to biased results is not, 
by itself, an argument against legislative history. It is just an argument against 
 
25. Parties may well be incomplete in their argumentation, although ordinarily we can 
expect the skill of lawyers’ arguments at least roughly to track the importance of issues to the 
parties they represent; if it does not, the problem is with poor representation, not with insufficient 
formalism. I have addressed in other work the problems that may arise in setting precedent from 
insufficiently argued law. See generally Bayern, supra note 19. But problems with precedent 
ought to be addressed by more sensitive evaluation of precedent, not by limiting the ways that 
cases are decided in the first instance. 
26. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
27. Id. at 519–28. 
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bad analysis of legislative history. Similarly, as we shall see in Part III, the 
mere opportunity for one party to make a bad argument to a court is usually not 
problematic on its own.28 
My goal so far has just been to show, at a very general level of analysis, 
that individuals’ rational ignorance and closed-mindedness need not extend to 
courts. Courts hear arguments from adverse parties and are in many cases made 
up of groups of people. Moreover, formalism seems to harbor an argument that 
courts ought to be more ignorant than individuals in that formalists suggest 
bright-line rules are needed to limit the information and arguments courts can 
consider, whereas individuals are more fluid in their processing limitations. 
This is not, of course, a comprehensive refutation of formalism, just a 
suggestion that there is little reason to think rational ignorance and rational 
closed-mindedness are generally foreordained in law. 
In the next Part, I will amplify my argument by demonstrating some more 
specific failings of economic formalism in contract law—that is, of the leading 
modern argument that courts should be rationally ignorant or closed-minded. 
To this end, I address Schwartz and Scott’s argument for contract formalism in 
depth. There, my goal will be not just to show that formalism is not inevitable 
but that it is a seriously flawed approach to contract adjudication. 
I do not argue that all evidence in all cases needs to be heard and 
considered exhaustively. Surely sometimes, in view of the fact that some 
information is costly to process, only of marginal relevance, or excessively 
prejudicial, courts need not consider it in detail. But to imagine we can figure 
this out beforehand in all contract cases, or at least in enough cases to set a 
default rule that excludes most evidence beyond written contracts, is 
unwarranted. 
III 
IGNORANCE AND CLOSED-MINDEDNESS AS PURPORTED WEALTH 
MAXIMIZATION IN CONTRACT LAW 
One of the most thorough recent analytical defenses of formalism in 
contract law comes from Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, who offer an 
influential view of contract interpretation that rests largely on the costs and 
benefits of considering different kinds of information when interpreting 
contracts.29 Their conclusion, put simply, is that rational and risk-neutral firms 
would prefer courts to use limited information (consisting mostly of the text of 
contracts) because to do so is efficient. Schwartz and Scott believe that 
deciding contract cases using more information—like precontractual memos or 
industry custom—is more expensive but yields no offsetting expected benefit to 
risk-neutral firms. This is because risk-neutral firms care only about the 
 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 61 and 73. 
29. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7. 
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expected value (roughly, the average) of a court’s possible interpretations but 
not about the variance (roughly, the range) of those interpretations.30 
The argument that Schwartz and Scott put forward for formalist contract 
interpretation, though helpful in clarifying the economic issues at stake in 
interpreting contacts, ultimately rests on something resembling sleight of hand. 
Showing why this is so serves as a demonstration of ways in which formalist 
arguments tend to fail to achieve even purely economic goals. In Part A below, 
I outline Schwartz and Scott’s argument; in the three Parts that follow it, I 
address problems with the argument in detail. 
A. Schwartz and Scott’s Formalist Argument 
Schwartz and Scott’s argument proceeds essentially as follows.31 Consider 
a case in which contracting parties dispute the meaning of their contract, and 
the court’s interpretation can be more or less favorable to either party. To 
formalize the idea that interpretations that favor one party hurt the other, 
Schwartz and Scott model the meaning of a disputed contractual term as a 
number on a number line, where higher numbers are better for one party and 
lower ones better for the other.32 (This, of course, is an abstraction, but not one 
that I need to dispute.) So, for instance, the parties might have originally agreed 
to a state of affairs represented by the number forty-six. The court, in 
 
30. Id. at 575–76. 
31. I simplify their argument here somewhat, but not in ways that affect its validity against 
the criticisms I offer. In particular, I discuss only the case of continuous payoffs, see id. at 574–77, 
versus discontinuous payoffs, see id. at 578–83, but my criticisms are meant to apply to their 
general argument for formalist contract interpretation. Similarly, I do not detail or respond to 
every assumption that Schwartz and Scott make, even in some cases where I think they are 
incorrect or unjustified. 
It is perhaps worth noting, however, that the central assumption of risk-neutrality is probably 
poorly descriptive even of the behavior of large firms. Firms are likely risk-neutral in some 
respects, but probably not when it comes to significant litigation, which might involve large sums 
that serve potentially as shocks and that might have a public dimension or at least extend in 
importance beyond a particular dispute. Moreover, firms’ decision makers are individuals or 
groups of them, and individuals are likely to be risk-averse even on behalf of companies that 
ought by rights to be more risk-neutral; their own careers or reputations may depend at least 
indirectly on the successful resolution of a case, for example. 
Even Schwartz and Scott struggle with their assumption of pure risk-neutrality among firms. 
They wonder, for instance, why risk-neutral firms would ever engage in fixed-price contracts in 
thick markets. Id. at 562–63. Schwartz and Scott explain such contracts by suggesting firms act as 
if they are risk-averse when the stakes are high enough. Id. at 564. Of course, this recognition 
should—as they briefly acknowledge, id. at 558—apply just as well to firms’ attitudes toward 
contract interpretation. In any event, I don’t think fixed-price contracts are mysterious; there are 
many reasons they might be made, even in thick markets. Perhaps the most significant is that 
contracts can ensure supply, and the price terms in such contracts, even if fixed, may not be 
significant; moreover, corporate structure may come to the fore in situations like this, with 
negotiators either (a) wanting to guarantee a particular price because they are risk-averse or (b) 
constrained by a particular division’s budget, which simplifies intra-corporate planning even if the 
corporation as a whole is risk-neutral. 
32. Id. at 573–75. 
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interpreting the contract, might choose a particular reading that corresponds to 
a different number—say, fifty-two. One party gains and the other party loses 
from this difference. 
Schwartz and Scott defend formalism, given this way of understanding 
contract interpretation, by observing that if contracting firms expect the court’s 
interpretation to average at the number they originally agreed on, then all is 
well. This is because firms are taken to be risk-neutral—that is, they care about 
average (“expected”) values, not specifically about results.33 Thus, if my 
original agreement was for the number fifty and I am risk-neutral, I will not 
care whether the expected result of interpreting my agreement will be always 
fifty, or forty half of the time and sixty the other half of the time, or thirty half 
of the time and seventy the other half of the time, and so on.34 As a rational 
firm dealing with contracts that don’t threaten to destroy my business, I am said 
to be indifferent to this risk: I’ll probably win some and lose some, and I expect 
the costs and benefits to cancel each other out. 
If I am indifferent to this risk, I would prefer not to pay to reduce it. 
Suppose, for instance, that I have two choices in the methodology that courts 
will follow to interpret my contract. Under one, courts will use only what 
Schwartz and Scott call the “minimum evidentiary base,” which they define as 
the text of the contract, a dictionary, averments about the history of 
performance, and general common sense.35 Under the other, the court will 
allow further information, such as precontractual memos, my testimony about 
what I actually thought when I was contracting, information about industry 
custom, and so on. 
Suppose my contracting partner and I agreed on the number fifty. 
Schwartz and Scott’s central conclusion is that even if the larger base of 
information reduces my risk (say, makes it nearly certain that the court will 
decide on the number fifty, rather than something between thirty and seventy), 
using this larger base of information will not be worthwhile because of its 
costs: I’ll have to introduce more evidence, contest more evidence, go through 
a longer trial, and pay my lawyers more.36 Given that I didn’t care about the 
risk (formally, the variance) in the court’s result in the first place, I would 
 
33. For example, a risk-neutral party will be completely indifferent between receiving $1 
and being told that it has a 50% chance of receiving $2. 
34. Schwartz and Scott seem to suggest that their argument requires that courts reach the 
right particular result some of the time (i.e., “with positive probability”), Schwartz & Scott, supra 
note 7, at 574–75, but this assumption is not in fact necessary for their analysis, even in the case of 
continuous payoffs. It may be required if payoffs are to be imagined as truly “continuous,” but a 
case where payoffs are continuous except that one intermediate value is impossible to reach is 
more properly treated under Schwartz and Scott’s analysis like other continuous-payoff cases than 
like their discontinuous-payoff cases. 
35. Id. at 572–73. 
36. See id. at 576 (“As the permissible evidentiary base widens, each party has incentives 
to introduce more evidence and, in turn, will need to contest more evidence. Since trials are 
expensive, risk-neutral firms [prefer courts to use less information].”). 
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prefer not to pay to reduce it. Instead, I’d prefer the minimal evidentiary base. 
This, of course, is specifically an argument for the court to be rationally 
ignorant: what Schwartz and Scott are saying is that the court will maximize 
value for the parties, all things considered, if it relies on less information rather 
than more information.37 
Schwartz and Scott, accordingly, defend the use of the “minimum 
evidentiary base.” This base is not, of course, the absolute minimum we might 
use. For example, we could truly minimize adjudication costs by having courts 
flip a coin to reach a decision. But Schwartz and Scott suggest that the 
informational base they describe provides the minimal evidence necessary for 
courts’ interpretations to average at the correct interpretation of the contract.38 
That is, courts are taken to be unbiased in general, and if they are supplied with 
the contract text, a dictionary, and the parties’ claims about the history of 
performance—and if they’re allowed to use their own background 
knowledge—then Schwartz and Scott believe that courts will, on average, reach 
the correct interpretation.39 Courts could, again, get closer to the correct 
interpretation more often if they used more evidence, but risk-neutral parties 
care only about the average value of the court’s interpretation. Thus, Schwartz 
and Scott purport to show that courts should not look beyond the “minimum 
evidentiary base.” 
But Schwartz and Scott’s argument—a useful and clear statement of the 
best modern formalist insights on the topic—fails for at least three subtle 
reasons. First, it depends on assumptions that superficially seem 
unobjectionable but are essentially impossible; to say this differently, the 
limitations they place on their argument essentially rule out its applicability to 
any real cases. Second, even correcting for this deficiency, the argument 
confuses probability with uncertainty and as a result is almost entirely circular. 
Third, by focusing only on litigated disputes, Schwartz and Scott’s argument 
implicitly imagines that settlement between parties is impossible; accounting 
for settlements, however, suggests that if Schwartz and Scott’s model were 
 
37. Schwartz and Scott’s iteration of economic formalism differs in an important respect 
from an earlier view that assumed that formalism promoted a traditional kind of “certainty” in 
legal results and thereby decreased the variance of the outcome. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The 
Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 848 (2000) (“[A] rigorous 
application of the common-law plain meaning and parol evidence rules [would] preserve the value 
of predictable interpretation . . . .”). I take Schwartz and Scott, in the analysis to which I respond 
here, to be attempting to defend formalism even assuming the validity of arguments that 
interpretive formalism does not promote greater certainty. See generally, e.g., Stanley Fish, There 
Is No Textualist Position, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 629 (2005). 
38. Perhaps importantly, Schwartz and Scott do not state the argument this way, but this is 
what they must mean. They instead make this assumption implicit and devote their energy to 
defending the assertion that courts will sometimes find the correct meaning and that, being 
unbiased, they will not veer from it in one direction more than in the other. See Schwartz & Scott, 
supra note 7, at 575–77. I elaborate infra on the distinction between these two views. 
39. Id. at 574–75. 
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indeed correct, cases would probably never be litigated in the first place. 
The following three Parts address each of these weaknesses in greater 
detail: Part B explains why Schwartz and Scott’s argument has trouble making 
predictions about real cases, Part C discusses the circularity caused by a 
conflation of probability with uncertainty, and Part D explores the role that the 
possibility of settlement plays in undermining Schwartz and Scott’s argument. 
B. The Relationship between Contractual Gaps and Interpretation 
Schwartz and Scott firmly tie their argument to contract interpretation, 
and they aim for it to address only matters that the parties actually decided, not 
gaps in their contract—that is, questions that the parties never resolved—for 
which the court must supply new terms.40 Highlighting this limitation is not 
pedantic on my part; it is specifically what Schwartz and Scott have in mind. 
For example, they note explicitly that their formalist interpretive argument 
applies only to “cases in which the parties have attempted to solve their 
problem with written words.”41 They continue: “The court, that is, is not called 
upon to fill gaps, but rather is asked to discover what the parties intended their 
written words to do.”42 They observe further that courts “can only interpret 
what is said, so our analysis [has] assumed that the parties’ writing was 
complete for the subjects at issue.”43 Their aim is specifically to suggest that 
interpretive rules, which are not currently formalistic,44 ought to be more 
formalistic.45 Gaps, they argue, ought to be treated separately46 and perhaps not 
formalistically—a point to which I will return later. 
In analyzing contract interpretation, then, Schwartz and Scott are 
considering cases in which the parties reached an actual agreement on an issue 
but have faced difficulty conveying that agreement to courts with written 
words. Of course, in these cases, we cannot treat Schwartz and Scott’s 
numerical abstraction of contract interpretation literally; if parties agree on a 
particular number, they could of course simply write that number into the 
contract and eliminate any disagreement, barring unusual situations in which 
written numbers may be ambiguous.47 But that alone isn’t fatal to Schwartz and 
 
40. See id. at 568 n.50 (restricting the formalist interpretive argument to “cases in which 
the parties have attempted to solve their problem with written words [such that t]he court . . . is 
not called upon to fill gaps, but rather is asked to discover what the parties intended their written 
words to do.”). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 594. 
44. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981) (reasonable meaning 
of disputed contract terms prevails); id. § 202 (interpretation proceeds “in the light of all the 
circumstances” and in view of the parties’ purpose); id. § 203(a) (reasonable interpretations 
favored). 
45. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 568–73, 569 n.52. 
46. Id. at 594–609. 
47. These cases are not unheard of, but they generally involve disputes about how precise a 
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Scott’s argument. 
What is fatal, at least to the particular view that Schwartz and Scott spell 
out, is that they make the following series of assumptions. First, they assume 
the parties considered, and reached agreement on, a specific potential conflict. 
(Otherwise, there would be a gap in the agreement, and the court would have to 
figure out what to do in circumstances the parties did not predict or decide to 
address.) Second, Schwartz and Scott assume that the parties thought the matter 
was important enough, and that litigation about the particular potential 
disagreement at issue was likely enough, that they attempted to address the 
potential conflict in their written agreement. (Again, without this assumption, 
the written agreement would have a gap, and the court would not be engaged in 
interpretation, as Schwartz and Scott define it.) Third, they assume that the 
language the parties used to address this specific disagreement nonetheless fails 
to resolve the very disagreement at issue. Fourth, they assume that despite this 
failing in the language, the parties have a shared, specific expectation in mind 
about the agreement, and they expect that the average interpretation by a court 
will, from the text and minimal additional information alone, have the same 
value as their shared, specific expectations. 
To demonstrate how wildly unlikely it is that all these assumptions hold at 
once, in the same case, I will elaborate the example that Schwartz and Scott 
use: one in which the contract “requires the seller to prepare machines prior to 
delivery so as to minimize the buyer’s cost of adjusting the machines for their 
intended use” and where the parties eventually “disagree over whether the 
seller fully complied with its duty to prepare the machines.”48 So, for instance, 
suppose that the parties agreed that the seller would deliver a particular 
collection of 450 desktop PCs to the buyer’s office, with a particular set of 
software installed. For Schwartz and Scott’s four assumptions all to hold at 
once, we must imagine something like the following scenario: The buyer and 
seller agree that a collection of particular versions of software programs will be 
licensed and preinstalled on the PCs. The parties anticipate a specific future 
disagreement about the version or configuration of a specific program (say, an 
e-mail program), and they resolve this disagreement. They consider this issue 
important enough to write its solution into the contract; that is, at least one of 
 
number was meant to be, not the numeric quantities that written numerals represent. See, e.g., S. 
Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581, 582 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (a 
case, cited by Schwartz and Scott, in which the meaning of “‘approximately 70,000 cubic yards’ 
of concrete” was disputed). On the other hand, even a written number might be illegible or 
otherwise confusing. See Valente v. R.I. Lottery Comm’n, 544 A.2d 586, 587 (R.I. 1988) 
(“Photographs of the ticket at issue were introduced at trial. These photographs revealed that the 
numeral that plaintiff had stated ‘appeared to be a 1,’ was blurred and ambiguous.”); cf. Dowell v. 
Remmer, 254 N.Y.S.2d 457, 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (“The burden of proof was on the 
plaintiffs to establish that the hospital nurses gave Mrs. Dowell 175 milligrams of demerol instead 
of the 75 milligrams ordered by her doctor. The only evidence on which plaintiffs base their claim 
is a nurse’s entry on the labor record of the numeral 75 written over the numeral 100.”). 
48. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 574. 
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the parties thinks that if they don’t write their solution into the contract, it 
might be hard to demonstrate in the future that the parties reached this 
particular agreement. Accordingly, they add terms to their written agreement 
that specify the obligation about the particular version or configuration of the e-
mail program at issue, in view of the potential future disagreement they have in 
mind. The language, nonetheless, fails to resolve the disagreement that the 
parties specifically considered. There is, instead, a significant range of possible 
interpretations that a court might plausibly supply, instead of the particular 
agreement the parties reached (and insignificant variations thereof). 
Fortunately, however, the expected value of this range precisely matches the 
parties’ agreement. 
Several elements are in tension in this unlikely scenario. Schwartz and 
Scott purport to address questions the parties actually decided, rather than 
contractual gaps, but then seem to ignore that the contract’s text is likely to be 
least ambiguous when it addresses specifically contemplated potential 
disagreements. In fact, if there is really no gap in the written contract on a 
particular issue the parties expected but ambiguity remains as to that issue, it 
means that the parties reached a decision that resolves the specific ambiguity on 
that issue, aimed to write the solution to that specific ambiguity into the written 
contract, but nonetheless used language that retains that specific ambiguity. 
This alone is unlikely as a general matter, but it is possible (and frequently 
reflected in litigated cases) because parties can always be sloppy, careless, or 
thoughtless in their language. But when this happens, Schwartz and Scott’s 
next assumption becomes extravagant: they assume that even in the case of 
language so sloppy that it fails to achieve its purpose of avoiding a very 
specific disagreement, courts’ expected (average) interpretation is the correct 
answer; that is, it happens to equal, exactly, the actual agreement of the parties. 
My sense is that Schwartz and Scott may have overlooked precisely how 
much they have limited their argument in confining it to “interpretation” versus 
“gaps,” as if the two are meaningfully different. The general interpretive 
problem that courts face is not different for gaps and for “interpretive” 
questions; indeed, interpretive questions are only interpretive questions because 
the written contract contains some gap. If a distinction between the two 
problems is forced, we end up with the unlikely scenario I’ve just described, 
where language fails to do what it’s intended to do, but nonetheless where 
Schwartz and Scott need to assume that courts will on average reach the correct 
results. 
Regardless, Schwartz and Scott seem genuinely to think that gaps are so 
different from interpretive problems that the same analysis can’t apply to them. 
Gap filling, for Schwartz and Scott, is a different activity that should generally 
be resolved either by “dismiss[ing] a case on the ground that a contract is too 
indefinite to enforce, or . . . read[ing] the contract to reach a reasonable 
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result.”49 To assume all contracting firms prefer that their contracts be 
potentially unenforceable (because those contracts are necessarily incomplete 
and contain some gaps)50 requires a leap of faith, and Schwartz and Scott do 
not justify that result. Reaching a “reasonable” result is, on the other hand, 
exactly what the existing rules, which are not formalist, aim to do.51 
In any event, even if the distinction between gaps and interpretation is 
analytically coherent, it is far from clear that courts can, at the time of 
litigation, discern the difference between gaps and interpretive questions. All 
that remains at litigation, in both cases, is language that appears not to answer 
the particular question the parties have raised. Even if the contracting parties 
originally could have distinguished gaps from interpretive questions, it is 
unlikely that courts can reconstruct this difference from written text alone. 
C. Two Meanings of “Bias,” and Sleight of Hand 
To interpret Schwartz and Scott’s argument generously, I’m going to 
avoid relying exclusively on the difficulty of separating interpretive questions 
from gap-filling endeavors.52 That is, I will suppose, for argument’s sake, that 
Schwartz and Scott’s argument is meant generally for situations in which courts 
have to read some result into a contract whose text (plus other features of the 
 
49. Id. at 609. 
50. See generally Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structures (1995). 
Amir Licht puts it nicely: 
In contrast to what some scholars and courts may have believed in the past, commercial 
relationships between corporations and their creditors can never be ‘exhaustively 
documented’ in a contract. The complete contingent contract—namely, the contract that 
defines the parties’ rights and entitlements in every future contingency—is impossible 
to achieve. 
Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive 
Style, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 649, 708 (2004). 
51. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 568 n.50. 
52. Recall that the interpretative situation Schwartz and Scott have in mind is one in which 
the parties anticipate a specific disagreement but find written language inadequate to the task of 
conveying their solution to that specific disagreement. It is possible that the unstated prominence 
of this situation for Schwartz and Scott comes from their familiarity with what economists call 
contract theory, which has come to emphasize the possibility that information will be known by 
both parties but impossible to prove to courts. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, 
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187, 191 
(2005) (“Over the past twenty years or so, back-end obstacles have driven a large body of the 
theorists’ models: namely, that some states of the world are not verifiable to a court, even though 
they may be observable to both the parties.”). 
A way to state the fundamental tension in Schwartz and Scott’s argument in terms of contract 
theory is as follows: the argument appears to assume that written text can both (1) have a 
particular expected value observable ex ante to two commercial parties using a well-known 
language and (2) nonetheless retain ambiguity because this expected value is not verifiable to a 
court (at least without information beyond the “minimum evidentiary base”). But it is unclear why 
this would be so—that is, why parties have access to information about what courts will do (in 
response to written text in a well-known language) that courts themselves do not have. There are 
several possible ways to address this tension, but they likely require additional assumptions on 
Schwartz and Scott’s part that would further limit the scope of their argument. 
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“minimal evidentiary base”) doesn’t absolutely dictate that result, whether we 
call this activity “gap filling” or “interpretation.” Even so, Schwartz and Scott’s 
argument suffers from a deep problem that is essentially a conceptual 
mathematical error. By conflating different notions of “bias” and by assuming 
that very specific probability distributions apply to the courts’ results in the 
cases they are considering, they more or less assume the result that they set out 
to demonstrate. 
The central assumption that Schwartz and Scott make is that courts’ 
average expected interpretive result will be the correct one. By referring to the 
“correct” result, I mean the one that the parties originally wanted (or perhaps 
would have wanted, given my extension of Schwartz and Scott’s argument).53 
Simply put, there is no reason to suppose that this is correct; Schwartz and 
Scott justify the assumption by what amounts to sleight of hand. 
Schwartz and Scott defend the notion that courts’ expected result is the 
correct result by saying that “there is no reason to believe that courts will 
systematically deviate from the correct answer . . . in ways that are more or less 
favorable to particular parties or classes of firms.”54 This justification appears 
to confuse a casual definition of the word “bias” with a formal statistical 
definition of it. Even if we suppose that a court is not systematically prone to 
favor one party or kind of party over another, that supposition does not compel 
the conclusion that the meaning the court supplies to a contract will average at 
the particular meaning the parties previously reached. 
 
53. I borrow the term “correct” from Schwartz and Scott, although it is unclear whether 
they mean precisely the same thing by it as I do. They first describe the notion in terms similar to 
mine: “The ‘correct answer’ is the solution to a contracting problem that the parties intended to 
enact.” Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 568–69. But then they elaborate: “Intention, however, 
is determined objectively and prospectively: A party is taken to mean what its contract partner 
could plausibly believe it meant when the parties contracted.” Id. at 569. This definition of 
intention may suggest that the “correct” interpretive answer has nothing (directly) to do with the 
subjective agreement that the parties reached but instead with some objective meaning that their 
expressions to one another had. 
There are several problems with viewing the “correct” meaning this way, however, even 
accepting for argument’s sake that expressions can have objective meanings. Most simply, the two 
justifications Schwartz and Scott offer for courts’ pursuit of “correct” interpretations support a 
subjective understanding of intent rather than an objective one (and suggest that they really have 
subjective agreements in mind). Schwartz and Scott say that courts should aim to reach correct 
interpretations because (1) courts should hold a contracting person to do only “what he had agreed 
to do,” and (2) maximizing contracting surplus “is unattainable if courts fail to enforce the parties’ 
solution but rather impose some other solution[, and courts should therefore] ascertain the solution 
that the parties actually adopted.” Id. 
More fundamentally for my purposes here, a defense of formalism approaches circularity if it 
assumes that the right target of contractual interpretation is the objective meaning of the parties’ 
expressions. In other words, if Schwartz and Scott’s argument is that courts ought to act 
formalistically because courts axiomatically ought to pursue a roughly formalist goal, there is little 
else for critics of the argument to do but reject the axiom. 
For an insightful recent discussion of subjectivity and objectivity in contract law, see 
Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 353 (2007). 
54. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 575. 
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1. The Central Unjustified Assumption 
To see why this is so, consider the following situation, embracing 
Schwartz and Scott’s abstraction of courts’ interpretive decisions to points on a 
number line.55 We are told that a court is going to pick some number from 
among all whole numbers (that is, from the range of numbers that looks like  
“. . . -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3 . . .” where both ends extend to infinity). Furthermore, 
we are told that there is no more reason to suppose this number will be greater 
than fifty rather than less than fifty. From this, it might be tempting to conclude 
that the expected value of the number the court will pick is fifty. After all, if we 
have no reason to suppose that the court’s number will be higher or lower than 
fifty, then it seems like each possibility is equally likely in fully symmetric 
ways, and thus the average value appears to be fifty. Reasoning in this way, 
however, is fallacious. Just because we have no reason to believe that the 
court’s number is more likely to be greater than fifty than it is to be less than 
fifty, and vice versa, does not mean that the expected value of the court’s 
number is fifty. Consider that we might also have no reason to believe the 
number is going to be higher or lower than sixty, or seventy, or any other given 
number. 
Simply put, the mere lack of a suspicion of “bias” tells us nothing, alone, 
about expected values. We need some affirmative reason to think the average 
decision will be the correct one; otherwise, we could pick any other possible 
decision and still say: “The court has no systematic reason to veer up or down 
from this decision.” Knowledge of expected values depends on knowledge of 
the likelihoods of the various possible outcomes; we cannot, from mere 
uncertainty, determine specific expectations.56 As economic commentators 
have nicely put it: 
Uncertainty is not equatable with risk [or probability]. Risk implies 
the existence of (and the knowledge of) a definable numerical series, 
the constituents of which can be identified and discounted. . . . Risk 
relates to knowledge of the appropriate probability distribution; 
uncertainty implies that we do not know whether any such 




56. There is a rich literature on the distinction between probability and uncertainty, but that 
doesn’t stop commentators from assuming that probability distributions are known when they are 
not. See, e.g., Mark Perlman & Charles R. McCann, Jr., Varieties of Uncertainty, in 
Uncertainty in Economic Thought 9 (Christian Schmidt ed., 1996) (summarizing several 
approaches to uncertainty); cf. Paul Davidson, Some Misunderstanding on Uncertainty in Modern 
Classical Economics, in Uncertainty in Economic Thought 21, 28 (Christian Schmidt ed., 
1996) (“The current fad in mainstream economics is to argue as if all economic observations are 
part of time series realizations generated by stochastic processes.”); see generally, Frank H. 
Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921). 
57. Perlman & McCann, Jr., supra note 56, at 11–12. 
BAYERN FINAL.DOC 8/28/2009  3:31 PM 
962 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:943 
In other words, in cases of pure uncertainty, there are simply no 
probability distributions to deal with and thus no way to compute expected 
values sensibly. How much would you pay for a chance at some amount of 
money, to be determined by an undisclosed procedure? Is there a God? Do we 
exist in a computer simulation?58 The answers to questions like these are at best 
subject to rough speculation in subjective probabilistic terms, where probability 
distributions might be proposed and debated by people with particular 
intuitions, particular scientific understandings, different experiences with the 
world, and so forth.59 But they are not subject to definite probabilistic analysis, 
as if a known expected value can be computed. Squarely and honestly 
recognizing uncertainty requires that we avoid resting arguments on the 
assumption that all uncertainty can be modeled by particular probability 
distributions. Just because the conflation between probability and uncertainty is 
convenient does not make it correct.60 
2. Assumptions Regarding Probability Distributions in General 
In considering what you’d rationally pay for a chance at an amount of 
money to be determined by an undisclosed procedure, infinities come into play 
and may obscure the analysis. In considering all possible sums of money, 
ranging in at least one direction toward infinity, there is no midpoint to speak 
of and thus not even a way to begin fixating on any potential “average” in the 
abstract, in any sense. 
But even when there is a midpoint—that is, even when (as perhaps is 
usual) there are upper and lower limits on the possible outcomes of a case—
that alone, too, is insufficient to justify an assumption that the midpoint is the 
expected value. For one thing, medians (midpoints) routinely differ from means 
in many kinds of distributions. More generally, it would require specific 
knowledge, or at least a specific assumption, to associate the midpoint of a 
 
58. Cf. Nick Bostrom, Are We Living in a Computer Simluation?, 53 Phil. Q. 243 (2003) 
(arguing that this possibility is perhaps more “likely” than typically supposed). 
59. Strictly speaking, determining the expected value of a random variable requires 
knowing the expected distribution of that variable—that is, the range of possible values and their 
probabilities. See Thomas M. Cover & Joy A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory 13 
(1991). These expectations may be subject, of course, to subjective probabilistic beliefs, 
determined by intuition and background knowledge, but in the abstract they cannot be derived 
from scratch. 
60. It is worth pointing out that neutrality to risk does not necessarily imply neutrality 
toward uncertainty. Cf. Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. Econ. 
643, 646 (1961) (proposing that individuals might not ignore uncertainty). Another response to 
Schwartz and Scott’s argument, then, is that even risk-neutral firms may not be uncertainty-
neutral. It is reasonable to imagine managers of risk-neutral enterprises preferring certainty to 
uncertainty on behalf of the enterprise, and to be willing to pay something for this, particularly 
given that nobody is really risk-neutral if the stakes are large enough: even the most rational firms 
are not risk-neutral with respect to life-or-death decisions for the firm, and pure uncertainty may 
imply that there is an opportunity for significantly negative results (or may at least make it 
impossible to rule out those results). 
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range with any kind of average. 
To illustrate, imagine that we know that in a particular contract case, the 
court isn’t really considering awarding all possible measures of damages. 
Suppose instead that the terms of a case make it so that the only reasonably 
expected range for damages is $20,000–$60,000. In that case, it may 
superficially seem reasonable to suppose that the expected value of damages—
assuming we know nothing more than the range—is $40,000, the average of the 
upper and lower limits. In some cases that may well be the expected value, but 
accepting it as a particular expectation requires a further specific assumption—
for instance, that all values within the range are equally likely to occur. 
However, if it is not known that all values within a range are equally 
likely, merely assuming that they are is not helpful (or required by any kind of 
rationality or risk-neutrality). For instance, if you’re told nothing other than that 
there are two possible outcomes of an abstract event, reason alone does not 
require that you assume the likelihood of each possibility is 50%. In fact, with 
pure uncertainty, 50% is just as arbitrary a bet as any other number. You might 
as well estimate probabilities purely on intuition, or make an entirely arbitrary 
guess. If you really don’t know what the likelihood is of either of the two 
events, there is simply nothing more to say about the probabilities of those two 
events. The probabilities are unknown. 
Indeed, in evaluating economic choices under conditions of pure 
uncertainty, it is better to say that there is no expected value than that the 
expected value is the average of possible cases’ values. For example, suppose 
you’re given the opportunity to participate, at a cost of $14, in a game in which 
you’re told you’ll be given either $10 or $20, as chosen by an undisclosed 
procedure. Assuming you’re risk-neutral, is it rationally required for you to pay 
$14 for the bet, given that the average of the two possible outcomes is $15? It 
may seem intuitive to think so, perhaps because many people have been 
conditioned to treat cases like this as if they’re governed by probabilities. In 
fact, people do tend to suppose that, without knowing more, it’s appropriate to 
say that the probability of each of the two possibilities (here $10 and $20) is 
50%. But this simply isn’t true. It is not irrational even for a risk-neutral party 
to turn down the bet.61 Without knowing or assuming more about the 
 
61. This sort of reasoning may lead to results that appear counterintuitive. For example, 
suppose you have a choice between two alternatives. In one case, you’re told you might be given 
either $10 or $20, to be decided by an undisclosed procedure. In the other case, you’re told you 
might be given either $5 or $21, by another undisclosed procedure. Should you choose the first 
case over the second case just because the values average to $15 instead of $13? It may seem 
natural to do so, but this is probably only because we generally have intuitions that uncertainty 
never governs a case entirely—that is, that what’s stated as uncertainty actually contains an 
element of probability too, so that we assume (for instance) that the two possibilities in each case 
are roughly equally likely (or that all the possible probability distributions favoring either 
direction somehow cancel out). But in fact, in cases of true uncertainty, you have no reason to 
pick one case over the other. You would not be irrational simply to flip a coin or to make an 
arbitrary decision between the two cases. One way of making an arbitrary decision would be to 
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probabilities of each possible outcome, the bet has no expected value.62 
Therefore you have little reason to play or not to play; you might as well make 
the decision arbitrarily, or decide based on some methodology other than a 
rational calculation of the odds.63 
The point of this admittedly abstract example is to suggest that there is no 
reason, theoretically or by default, to assume that events with truly unknown 
probabilities are equally likely to occur. Similarly, it is not always correct to 
assume that unknown data spreads evenly through a range of possible values, 
as in the sample contract case I mentioned earlier, where the possible damages 
range from $20,000 to $60,000. In some cases (as with truly random data), 
values might indeed be expected to spread evenly through the range. In others, 
the data may fit a normal distribution (a bell curve). But sometimes, and 
perhaps often, it might conform to neither of those preconceived templates, in 
which case computing the expected value of the distribution—that is, the 
weighted average—requires much more information than the endpoints of a 
range. 
For instance, suppose we need to determine the weighted average speed at 
which manmade vehicles are operated and that all we know is that, on one end 
of the spectrum, there are scooters that move at about 20 miles per hour and 
that, on the other hand, there are rocket ships that move at about 20,000 miles 
per hour. It would be wrong to assume from this information that the weighted 
average speed of manmade vehicles is the average of the two ends of the 
spectrum that we’re aware of—in this case, 10,010 miles per hour. The result, 
on just the information we’re given, is simply uncertain; we don’t have enough 
information to answer the question, knowing only the range of possible values. 
If we’re forced to make a decision, choosing the midpoint is not specifically 
more problematic than any other alternative, but it also has nothing specially to 
recommend it, except perhaps intuitions that we know more than we initially 
thought we did about the probability distribution at issue. For example, we 
might decide that we have some reason to think, perhaps based just on 
background experience, that normal distributions occur more frequently in 
problems like these than other sorts of distributions.64 
 
throw up your hands and say, “Well, I’m just going to assume that all possible outcomes are 
equally likely!” Whether this is a good way to proceed or not depends on unknown conditions, 
like what the probability distributions of the events really are. 
62. We do know, however, that if an expected value exists, it must be between $10 and 
$20, inclusive. More to the point, the result must be either $10 or $20. Accordingly, a rational, 
risk-neutral party ought not to turn down the bet if it costs $10 or less, and certainly ought to turn 
it down if it costs $20 or more. 
63. In practice, it may well be reasonable to be averse to uncertainty when facing 
artificially constructed bets like this because in the real world, blatantly stated uncertainty may be 
intended to obscure bad faith or other sorts of practices adverse to the bettor. Cf. Deborah Frisch 
& Jonathan Baron, Ambiguity and Rationality, 1 J. Behav. Decision Making 149, 152–53 
(1988) (offering several reasons people may avoid uncertainty). 
64. Bell curves—normal distributions—have wide applications in many fields, ranging 
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Given real uncertainty, there are a variety of approaches we can adopt to 
predict litigation outcomes. We can, like Schwartz and Scott, introduce a new 
assumption that the distribution of the values that we’re interested in happens to 
conform to a bell curve, or another similar shape that centers on the midpoint of 
an expected range. But for this to be a plausible approach, we need some 
reason to make this assumption. Thus, for Schwartz and Scott’s argument in 
favor of formalist contract interpretation to be correct on its own terms, we 
need to recharacterize its central assumption. It is not sufficient merely for 
courts to be “unbiased.” Instead, institutional considerations about courts in 
general, or courts interpreting contracts in particular, must lead us to believe 
that in cases where parties present alternative interpretations of a written 
contract, the court’s expected holding will average exactly to the ex ante 
agreement of the parties. This assumption seems heroic and implausible as a 
general matter, and I consider reasons it is specifically unlikely to be true in the 
next Section. 
3. Expected Values and Probability Distributions in Contract-Interpretation 
Cases 
In the prior Section, I showed that in the abstract, there is no justification 
for assuming the particular probability distribution that Schwartz and Scott 
assume. That is, on its own formal terms alone, the argument is unjustified. But 
of course we’re not limited to pure mathematical models in trying to predict the 
outcome of contract cases; we can draw on experience with and knowledge 
about courts and contract cases in doing so. In the cases Schwartz and Scott 
have in mind, however, practical and institutional considerations about courts 
and contract cases strongly suggest that courts employing the “minimum 
evidentiary base” will not, on average, reach the correct result. 
In contract-interpretation cases generally, we have no practical reason to 
imagine that courts will center on precisely the result that the parties originally 
had in mind. Schwartz and Scott occasionally seem to recognize this point; for 
instance, they observe in a somewhat different context that, if a party unduly 
persuades a court that an incorrect result is correct, the court’s result could be 
anything at all, rather than settling on a specific average that the parties had in 
mind: 
For example, assume a contract uses the word “red,” and a 
disappointed party persuades the court, wrongly, that the contract 
 
from pure mathematics and physics to psychology and natural science, because they happen to fit 
a variety of data well. There are sound theoretical reasons for this (simply put, it is the shape that 
results, given certain assumptions, from the additive combination of independent random 
selections of values), but it is wrong to assume without more that an unknown distribution is 
necessarily normal. See Enders A. Robinson, Statistical Reasoning and Decision Making 
61 (1981) (“Despite [the] seeming universality of the normal distribution, we cannot expect it to 
apply to every measurement . . . .”). 
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was written in a private language in which the word “red” meant 
“green.” Both red and green are vague. In this example, the space of 
possible judicial interpretations would center around some instance 
of the concept “green,” but the court here could not be right on 
average. It would be attempting to find the correct shade of green 
while the parties, ex ante, wanted a court to find the correct shade of 
red. When courts are mistaken regarding the contract’s language, 
their constructions must be inefficient . . . .65 
It is exceedingly difficult to construct a principled basis that allows 
Schwartz and Scott to separate the two cases—that is, to differentiate ordinary 
interpretative inquiries from those in which a court has been inappropriately 
persuaded by a party of an incorrect interpretation. Schwartz and Scott reach 
the two cases differently: in one case, they imagine that courts are interpreting a 
well-known word; in the other, they imagine that the very choice of an 
interpretive language is at stake, and choosing the wrong language (for 
instance, a private language of the parties as opposed to what Schwartz and 
Scott call “majority-talk”)66 will dictate the wrong result. But of course, the 
only difference here is a question of which particular framing is adopted: we 
could ask both (1) why, in the case of ordinary interpretation, a court might not 
be incorrectly persuaded by one of the parties, after which the result will 
necessarily be wrong and (2) why, in the case of language selection, we don’t 
begin our analysis prior to the point that the court has been led down an 
erroneous path. 
In any event, regardless of how the inquiry is framed, there is simply no 
reason to suppose that the average result (when using just the written text of 
agreements and other components of the minimal evidentiary base) will be the 
correct result. Schwartz and Scott’s only justification for this proposition is that 
contracting parties know that if their contracts are too vague, the “mean 
[interpretation] could be anywhere.”67 To ensure that the expected 
interpretation is knowable rather than unknown, “firms will attempt to write 
contracts with sufficient clarity to permit courts to find correct answers, though 
with error.”68 As noted briefly earlier,69 Schwartz and Scott seem to be aiming 
to justify only the assumption that courts can find the correct interpretation 
using the minimal evidentiary base (which, recall, includes the contract’s 
written text, a narrative of the contract’s performance, a dictionary, and general 
background knowledge). This may well be true. But they offer no real 
justification for the proposition that the correct interpretation will be at the 
weighted center of the probability distribution they imagine will characterize 
 
65. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 587. 
66. Id. at 586. 
67. Id. at 577. 
68. Id. 
69. See supra note 35. 
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courts’ decisions. Thus, they more or less assume their conclusion: their 
argument is essentially that if formalist textual interpretation is good enough to 
reach correct interpretations on average, then it is good enough. 
There are several reasons to suppose that, in fact, parties’ incentives to 
draft agreements carefully are insufficient to ensure that adjudication based on 
the minimal evidentiary base will allow courts’ decisions to average to the 
parties’ real agreement. Indeed, these incentives seem mostly irrelevant in the 
cases Schwartz and Scott have in mind. For cases in which courts need to 
construct meaning—either for poorly chosen language or gaps—whatever 
incentives the parties had to draft their contract carefully were already 
insufficient to avoid the lack of clarity that led to litigation. Such cases are not 
especially susceptible to a suggestion that “[i]t is optimal for risk-neutral firms 
to invest resources in drafting until the writing is sufficiently clear, in an 
objective sense, so that the mean of the distribution of possible judicial 
interpretations is the correct interpretation.”70 There may simply be a limit to 
the effectiveness of incentives to draft language carefully. Moreover, it is hard 
to imagine that contracting parties have precisely enough of an incentive to 
draft language carefully enough so that courts’ average interpretation will be 
correct but not carefully enough to avoid the dispute in the first place.71 
As a more general matter, even if it were sometimes true that 
commentators could agree on a specific expected distribution of interpretive 
responses to text by a court, it is systematically unlikely to be true in contract 
cases, particularly in the kind of contract cases Schwartz and Scott have in 
mind. For contract cases generally, compared to accident-law or criminal cases, 
there is little opportunity to aggregate repeated “runs” of the very similar cases 
in order to build a reliable probability distribution.72 For the specific kinds of 
cases Schwartz and Scott have in mind, in which parties intend for language to 
mean something specific but the language simply fails to achieve its purpose in 
ways the parties couldn’t expect, there is no reason to believe the court can, 
from this erroneous or sloppy language alone, reach interpretations that average 
 
70. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 577. 
71. Drafting, moreover, has a cost that is certain—whereas litigation’s cost is presumed to 
be small (because it must be discounted by the likelihood of litigation) at the time the contract is 
drafted. Indeed, the increased drafting costs under Schwartz and Scott’s suggested formalist 
approach may well be greater ex ante, in an expected-value sense, than the extra costs associated 
with more accurate contract interpretation during litigation. 
Similarly, formalism can encourage too much precaution in drafting, and it also might 
promote sharp drafting practices in bad faith by parties that hope to slip apparently irrelevant text 
past their counterparties (which in turn promotes further precaution in drafting), perhaps to 
introduce new clauses where the likelihood of a particular kind of potential sloppiness in drafting 
might be expected to bias in one’s favor, and so on. 
72. Cf. Perlman & McCann, Jr., supra note 56, at 12 (“[One] kind of uncertainty stresses 
the absence of enough experiences which will yield a stable probability function. Given sufficient 
cases, a distribution can usually be found; but just how many cases (how much ‘experience’) is 
required cannot be known a priori.”). 
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to the correct decision. Indeed, sloppy language is an especially poor candidate 
for text that, standing more or less alone, can produce a correct meaning on 
average. 
A related point is that in cases involving sloppy language, which largely 
approach “mistake” cases, the cost of correcting a contract that is before the 
court is likely to be small. The solution will probably not require complicated 
evidence; instead, straightforward facts about how the term in the contract fails 
to achieve the parties’ intent will likely suffice. This is because sloppy 
language is likely to be the result of a lapse, or mechanical error.73 It is possible 
for such a lapse to result in unintended language that the parties could 
nonetheless plausibly have agreed on (thus making the error more difficult to 
demonstrate), but given that such plausible agreements are a small set of all 
possible uses of language, it is more likely that the lapse will be evident and 
easily correctible.74 
To summarize, whether we are faced with (1) sloppy language that we 
know failed to reflect the agreement of the parties or (2) a contract provision 
that is so vague that a court must fill the gap, it seems particularly unlikely that 
the court’s interpretations will average to precisely the right answer from the 
text (and other minimal evidence) alone. 
D. The Possibility of Settlement 
Schwartz and Scott’s argument fails for an independent reason: even 
assuming its various assumptions were correct and that its model of probability 
held, it fails to take into account the incentives to settle cases that different 
legal rules might create. Schwartz and Scott paint the following picture of the 
costs and benefits of considering information beyond the “minimum 
evidentiary base” when interpreting contracts: 
As the evidentiary base approaches Bmax [the maximal evidentiary 
base, which includes testimony about industry custom and many other 
sorts of information], the variance in the [court’s] error . . . approaches 
zero. A risk-neutral party cares about the mean of the interpretation 
distribution but not the variance. This is because the variance term 
measures risk while risk-neutral parties are indifferent to risk. 
Therefore, it is enough for a risk-neutral firm that the expected 
interpretation . . . equals the correct interpretation . . . . Put another 
way, a firm’s preference at contract time is to have courts make 
interpretations on the minimum evidentiary base unless it would be 
 
73. Cf. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2, at 354 (discussing “lapses”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Mistake in Contract Law, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1573, 1584 (2003) (defining “mechanical errors” in 
“mistake” cases as “physical or intellectual blunders that result from transient errors in the 
mechanics of an actor’s internal machinery . . . .”). 
74. See Cover & Thomas, supra note 59, at 209–11 (discussing formal models of error 
correction). 
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costless to widen the base. But it is not costless.75 
In other words, Schwartz and Scott’s central aim, in discussing contract 
interpretation, is to show that even if more evidence tends toward theoretically 
perfect interpretive results, risk-neutral contracting firms will prefer that a 
minimal evidentiary base be used, in order to save on costs once litigation has 
begun. 
Such an analysis, however, fails to consider how parties might respond to 
a legal rule in which the evidence that they expect will be introduced will lead 
to a better interpretive result (or a narrower range of possible results). To begin 
with, it is important to emphasize again that, in Schwartz and Scott’s model, the 
“correct” interpretive result is something the parties had in mind when they 
initially reached their agreement.76 This follows from the fact that they reached 
a specific agreement on the issue in question, and Schwartz and Scott also state 
it as an explicit assumption: parties need to have a particular expected average 
interpretive result in mind for Schwartz and Scott’s analysis to work at all.77 
Thus, we can reasonably suppose that at the time of litigation, both parties still 
know what the theoretically correct interpretive result is. This result favors one 
party: the Ideal Winner, whose conduct conforms to the agreed-upon terms of 
the contract. The other party, the Ideal Loser, stands to benefit only if it can 
fool the court into adopting an alternative (incorrect) interpretation.78 
But assuming that the parties can introduce information from the maximal 
evidentiary base, we have—by Schwartz and Scott’s hypothesis—a situation 
where the court is expected to reach the correct result, or at least an 
interpretation very near the correct result. In this situation, the Ideal Winner and 
the Ideal Loser face a relatively simple antagonistic game: the Ideal Loser can 
try to introduce evidence that skews the decision in his direction, but he knows 
that if he does this, the Ideal Winner can attempt to introduce further evidence 
so that the court has all it needs to reach the correct result.79 Thus, in a litigation 
setting that permits the introduction of maximal evidence, the Ideal Loser 
 
75. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 576. 
76. Even if saying that an interpretation is “correct” means something else—cf. supra note 
53—my analysis here depends only on the ability for parties to know what the “correct” result is. 
This ability is a cornerstone of Schwartz and Scott’s argument: without it, the parties have no 
expected interpretive result from which Schwartz and Scott can derive the parties’ preference for 
the minimal evidentiary base in the first place. 
77. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 574. 
78. “Winner” and “loser” refer here to litigation positions; the point isn’t that the contract 
favored one “winning” party overall ex ante, but that it favors one party’s interpretive position ex 
post. 
79. This could be explained in more formal terms with payoff matrices, but ordinarily such 
formalization is unnecessary. For the leading economic perspective on settlement and litigation, 
which is consistent with my analysis in this Section, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal. Stud. 1, 6–17 (1984). As Priest and Klein 
recognize: “In litigation, as in gambling, agreement over the outcome leads parties to drop out.” 
Id. at 17. 
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knows he cannot win, at least as long as the Ideal Winner is paying attention.80 
At best, the Ideal Loser can force the Ideal Winner to incur some additional 
litigation expenses. But that strategy would cost the Ideal Loser something 
too—in fact, probably roughly the same amount.81 As a result, when all 
evidence may be heard, Schwartz and Scott’s model should predict that rational 
parties will settle on the interpretive issue in question: the result of the dispute 
is (according to Schwartz and Scott) nearly certain, and the parties have little 
reason to incur litigation expenses just to find out what they already know.82 
If the parties can perfectly estimate the court’s expected interpretations on 
the minimal evidentiary base (as Schwartz and Scott assume), we would expect 
them to settle as well, assuming (as Schwartz and Scott also do) that the parties 
are both rational and risk-neutral. Thus, at best, there is no difference between 
formalist and non-formalist legal rules; we would expect rational, risk-neutral 
parties to settle in all cases. 
If, however, we allow for the possibility that the parties will fail to settle, 
perhaps because some transaction costs associated with settlement are large 
(maybe the parties, though otherwise rational, simply don’t like one another) or 
because at least one of the parties is irrationally optimistic about his chances of 
getting a favorable (“biased”) interpretation from the court, then we would 
expect a rule that allows the maximal evidentiary base to be systematically 
better that one that allows smaller bases. This is because, as the variance in the 
court’s expected result decreases, there is simply less to be unduly optimistic 
about; the expected result is more certain, and there is systematically less 
reason to litigate. 
If this argument seems naggingly facile, it is probably because its purpose 
is only to respond to an argument that by its own terms sets rules for litigation 
 
80. Strictly speaking, the Ideal Loser would need to expect the Ideal Winner to be 
rational—an assumption that is not always correct, but one that we can take for granted here since 
Schwartz and Scott’s argument depends thoroughly on the rationality and risk-neutrality of firms 
that enter into contracts with one another. 
81. It is possible for the expected costs of litigation between the parties (or other features of 
the situation, like the parties’ relative resources to devote to litigation and their ability to 
externalize litigation costs) to be skewed such that the Ideal Loser has an incentive to threaten to 
introduce evidence just to require the Ideal Winner to incur greater settlement costs, and thus to 
extract a larger surplus from settlement. See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 2, at 446–47 (describing 
how differences in the parties’ litigation costs can distort incentives to settle lawsuits). However, 
this possibility is unlikely to be significant in the cases Schwartz and Scott describe: both parties 
are firms and are litigating the same contract. In any event, Schwartz and Scott aim for their model 
to apply generally, not only when a variety of further specific assumptions regarding the litigation 
environment hold. 
Similarly, my discussion of settlement assumes that parties have access to roughly symmetric 
information regarding the litigation; this, too, should be an unobjectionable assumption given the 
intended scope of Schwartz and Scott’s argument. 
82. See id. at 443–46 (arguing that fully rational parties facing the same litigation costs will 
fail to settle lawsuits only when at least one is unduly optimistic, a situation that cannot occur if 
the result is nearly certain). 
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under which litigation ought, by the argument’s assumptions, never to occur.83 
In responding in this way, I don’t mean to suggest that interpretive rules that 
are sensitive to a wide range of evidence ordinarily do, in fact, encourage 
settlement. I have little reason to think such rules particularly would or 
wouldn’t do so. My observation is only that following through on Schwartz and 
Scott’s own assumptions leads either to a situation in which litigation never 
occurs or one in which the formalist rule they propose is systematically worse 
than its alternative. 
E. Summary 
Schwartz and Scott purport to show that at least when parties to a contract 
are firms, rather than individuals, they will prefer that courts interpret contracts 
using only the text of written agreements, a history of performance, a 
dictionary, and some basic background knowledge.84 Given this preference, 
Schwartz and Scott maintain that courts should oblige: doing so will maximize 
the surplus for the parties. In short, Schwartz and Scott’s discussion of 
formalistic contract interpretation is a nicely representative argument for 
rational ignorance on the part of courts: their argument is that the costs of 
processing additional information outweigh the benefits of doing so. 
In some sense, Schwartz and Scott’s discussion is intended simply as a 
prediction of preferences among contracting firms: “Typical firms prefer courts 
to make interpretations on a narrow evidentiary base whose most significant 
component is the written contract.”85 In addition to making their prediction 
through formal analysis, they also suggest that it is empirically true: “There is 
considerable evidence that firms prefer a formalist adjudicatory style.”86 To 
support this claim, however, Schwartz and Scott point to nothing more than two 
articles written by Lisa Bernstein, another proponent of formalism.87 The cited 
references88 draw from individual case studies of close-knit industries with 
private adjudicators who, it turns out, seem sometimes to follow industry 
customs and are thus not really formalist or textualist after all.89 
 
83. Schwartz and Scott note that their argument “begin[s] at the litigation stage,” Schwartz 
& Scott, supra note 7, at 574, but they never evaluate this arbitrary starting point for the analysis 
or consider any incentives on parties prior to litigation. 
84. See id. at 573 (“[F]irms [that this set of cases describes] prefer courts to make 
interpretations on the minimum evidentiary base . . . except in unusual circumstances.”). 
85. Id. at 569. 
86. Id. at 576 n.66. 
87. Id. 
88. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1780 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, 
Merchant Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001). 
89. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 88, at 1780. As Barak Richman has shown, 
informal communities may also operate with informal contracts and large reputational sanctions, 
and they may best be explained with models that accommodate behavior beyond “simple profit 
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Schwartz and Scott have thus done nothing more, it seems, than to choose 
an evidentiary base that corresponds to textual formalism and then to assert 
without justification that reliance on this base will produce the correct result on 
average. In form, a similar argument could be made that risk-neutral firms 
would prefer a coin flip to a court trial, or that they would prefer no remedy at 
all in the event of breach (if the likelihood of being a plaintiff is the same as the 
likelihood of being a defendant). But failing to allow lawsuits—like deciding 
questions with a coin flip—gives parties perverse incentives. If lawsuits are not 
permitted, then the instrumental benefits of contract law, which creates value 
by allowing parties to make credible commitments, is lost. If all interpretive 
disputes are decided by coin flips, then parties have incentives to raise disputes 
even when they have no merit. These problems suggest the futility of enforcing 
such things as sloppy contractual language even when there is no plausible 
chance a court can reconstruct the parties’ agreement by relying on it alone. 
To summarize this somewhat differently, suppose that the possible results 
of a case range, on a number line, between zero and one hundred. To assume 
that all results are equally likely, or even that fifty is the mean of the possible 
results, requires a specific assumption: that the arguments will be roughly in 
equipoise. If two contracting parties agreed that they would have just one 
dispute, on a particular issue where it was clear at the outset that the arguments 
were equally compelling, Schwartz and Scott’s model might work. Instead, the 
contracting parties have little idea what particular disputes will arise, and they 
have no reason to imagine anything ex ante about the adjudicator’s interpretive 
mean. Perhaps they imagine their written language is so good that it admits of 
little ambiguity, but this confidence is belied by the fact that the language had a 
specific purpose and failed to achieve that specific purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Formalism’s economic advantages are illusory. At least, they cannot 
easily be derived from simple formulas, or pronounced after considering only a 
lofty abstraction of cases. Modern economic formalism, as set forth so far, is 
essentially an argument for a rigid kind of rational ignorance and rational 
closed-mindedness gone wrong, and it fails to achieve even its welfarist goals. 
Of course, in criticizing one leading formalist argument in detail, it is not 
my intent to establish that all arguments for formalism necessarily fail—and 
particularly not to demonstrate that they all fail for the same reasons. Schwartz 
and Scott’s argument is essentially an attempt to demonstrate firms’ 
preferences deductively, and my response is merely that the deduction does not 
work—and that purely formal deductions are unlikely to be helpful here. Some 
kinds of firms may well, in some situations, prefer formalist interpretive rules. 
 
maximizations.” Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: 
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry 383, 405–06 (2006). 
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If we could be confident of their preferences through empirical study or 
experience with the adjudication of cases, and if our goal remains to adopt 
majoritarian default rules, we might decide that formalist rules are appropriate 
in those particular situations. Similarly, as with information about the race or 
wealth of parties,90 there may well be classes of evidence that we decide (again 
through study or experience, or alternatively through propositions about 
fairness or morality) are unreliable indications of the merit of parties’ cases, or 
are prone to trigger prejudice or confusion. Indeed, we could even decide that 
certain kinds of evidence are simply not worth their adjudicative costs, after all. 
But ruling out broad classes of evidence needs to rest on a different and more 
robust argument than one that would eliminate most information from 
consideration based only on an attempt at a formal deduction. 
To make specific policy pronouncements in law from only an abstract 
understanding of Schwartz and Scott’s argument, and thus to derive the 
preference of firms through formal analysis alone, would be to do contract law 
a significant disservice. 
 
 
90. Cf. supra text accompanying note 22. 
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